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The Normalization of Immigration Law 
Mac LeBuhn*
In “The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law,” Professors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid 
Wuerth argue that the Supreme Court increasingly treats foreign relations law like other bodies 
of law—it has “normalized” this body of once-exceptional law. However, a subset of foreign 
relations law, immigration law, receives little attention in their account, which obscures the fact 
that immigration law, unlike the rest of foreign relations law, has not normalized in nearly the 
same fashion. 
To understand the normalization of immigration law, this paper proposes a theory of rights 
normalization: the Court has been reluctant to normalize immigration law except where 
immigrants’ rights are most at issue. Unlike foreign relation law normalization, immigration 
normalization has been halting and uneven in the contexts of justiciability, federalism and 
executive dominance. Yet, in questions affecting immigrants’ constitutional or international 
human rights, the Supreme Court has been more willing to normalize immigration law. Naturally, 
all immigration cases affect the rights of immigrants in some manner, but the Supreme Court shows 
an increased willingness to bring rights claims to the fore as a basis for rejecting exceptionalist 
arguments. In this way, the Supreme Court implements rights normalization. 
 
  
                                                 
* Mac LeBuhn, J.D. 2017, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. I would like to thank Erin F. Delaney, 
David Rubenstein and the staff and editors of the Northwestern Journal of Human Rights for their assistance. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [2017 
92 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court is slowly and surely shaping foreign relations law into a “normal” body 
of law. As Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth argue, foreign relations law, which includes national 
security, international and immigration law, has long been characterized as “exceptional,” given 
the Supreme Court’s distinctive treatment of questions of federalism, justiciability, and the 
dominance of the executive branch.1 Through a process of “normalization,” courts come to answer 
foreign relations questions no differently than other legal questions. However, immigration law, a 
subset of foreign relations law, does not figure prominently in their account. How, if at all, does 
immigration law fit into the story of foreign relations normalization? 
At least three narratives are possible. The first account holds that immigration law and foreign 
relations law have normalized together. Immigration law moves like a railcar connected to the 
larger foreign relations train, with all cars proceeding towards normalization.2 
In the second story, immigration law has remained exceptional and drifted apart from the rest 
of foreign relations law, which has normalized.3 
In the third story—the account that this paper advances—normalization has happened in parts 
of immigration law, but not others, with implications for the larger normalization story.4 In 
immigration law, the process of rights normalization erodes immigration exceptionalism when 
exceptional interpretations of immigration law implicate human rights questions.5 
The third story is more attractive, as neither of the first two narratives fits the reality of the 
Supreme Court’s immigration decisions over the previous four decades. For one, immigration law 
has not normalized with the rest of foreign affairs law. In decisions like Jama v. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement,6 the Court shows substantial deference to the executive branch on statutory 
interpretation and other matters. States are excluded from the regulation of immigration matters, 
                                                 
1 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1906–
11 (2015). 
2 Presumably, Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth, who expressly identify immigration as part of foreign relations law, 
would commit to this camp. See id. at 1907 n.28. This paper is largely addressed to the position that immigration and 
foreign relations law have normalized together, and it focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the account of this 
position that Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth provide. 
3 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) (arguing that 
“no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of 
constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role.”). See also Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration 
Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 289, 302 (2000) 
(arguing that the plenary power remains significant in immigration law); David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary 
Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 42 (2015) (proposing the plenary power is retained to provide the 
political branches flexibility in confronting foreign affairs challenges). 
4 I treat normalization of the various “siloes” of immigration as distinct processes for simplicity of argumentation 
here, but there is reason to suspect that normalization in one area of law may “spillover” into other areas of 
immigration law. For a thoughtful treatment of the relationships between the various elements of immigration law, 
see David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017). 
5 Although this Note departs from Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth’s understanding of what is exceptional about 
immigration law, it shares the same definition as to what exceptionalism is. Foreign relations exceptionalism occurs 
when “domestic and foreign affairs-related issues are analyzed in distinct ways as a matter of function, doctrine or 
methodology . . . . The term itself sets a baseline of generally applicable analysis . . . and seeks to identify places where 
the analysis of foreign affairs diverges from this baseline.” Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1907–08. 
6 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (holding that immigration authorities could remove an individual to Somalia, a country 
that had not consented to his arrival despite evidently clear statutory language requiring such consent). 
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as in Arizona v. United States,7 which Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth describe as an “outlier.”8 
The whole of immigration law is founded upon the plenary power doctrine, which holds that the 
federal government’s power to regulate immigration is inherent and unlimited. These are the cases 
one expects of an exceptional body of law. 
But it is inaccurate to say that immigration law remained wholly exceptional while the rest of 
foreign relations law changed. With respect to justiciability, federal courts, once wholly excluded 
from review of immigration cases, have now snuck their noses under the tent in high-profile, 
rights-related cases. In cases like Zadvydas v. Davis, non-justiciability arguments and arguments 
for deference to the executive branch are unable to prevent the Supreme Court’s intervention in 
the limitless detention of an immigrant.9 Likewise, the plenary power itself has been slowly eroded 
by the introduction of “phantom constitutional norms,”10 as well as direct application of 
constitutional and international-legal rights. Immigration law is best understood under the third 
narrative: it has normalized in those places where the rights of immigrants were most affected, and 
remained exceptional elsewhere.11 
Part I describes the manner in which immigration law and foreign relations exceptionalism 
have developed together. Part II describes the characteristics of foreign affairs exceptionalism, as 
evinced in immigration and other areas of foreign relations law. In Part III, the normalization 
framework that Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth developed is fit to immigration law, with mixed 
results. What renders foreign relations law exceptional is not precisely what renders immigration 
law exceptional and, on this alternative account of immigration exceptionalism, immigration law 
has not seen significant normalization. 
Part IV offers a new contribution to the study of foreign relations normalization: rights 
normalization provides an explanation for immigration law’s otherwise inconsistent departure 
from foreign relations exceptionalism. 
I. IMMIGRATION’S LASTING INFLUENCE UPON EXCEPTIONALISM 
It is a mistake to treat immigration and foreign relations exceptionalism as unrelated doctrines. 
The Supreme Court’s embrace of foreign relations exceptionalism was preceded by its 
development of immigration exceptionalism, which occurred through a series of cases handed 
down to a country gripped with anti-immigrant hysteria. 
This Part offers a revised account of the rise of foreign relations exceptionalism. First, it 
describes the Supreme Court decisions that embraced foreign relations exceptionalism in the 
context of immigration a full half-century before Justice George Sutherland, who has otherwise 
been described as the “central architect” of exceptionalism,12 arrived on the Court. Next, it reviews 
the contributions Justice Sutherland made to the exceptionalist view of foreign affairs. Finally, this 
Part reviews the immigration decisions arising during the early Cold War that built upon and 
                                                 
7 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
8 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1951 (noting that Justice Kennedy, the author of the opinion, employed 
“exceptionalist language” in reaching a decision illustrative of “immigration exceptionalism”). 
9 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (rejecting the government’s effort to indefinitely detain an immigrant despite apparent statutory 
authorization to do so). 
10 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990). 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1913. 
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extended the reigning foreign relations exceptionalism further into immigration law. As this Part 
attempts to show, the rise of immigration exceptionalism is intertwined with the birth of foreign 
relations exceptionalism. 
A. Foreign Relations Exceptionalism in Early Immigration Cases 
The central themes of foreign relations exceptionalism—an emphasis on non-justiciability, a 
disregard for federalism and a reliance upon inherent claims of authority13—were developed by 
the Supreme Court’s early immigration decisions. During the late nineteenth century, the Supreme 
Court rendered a string of immigration decisions establishing each of these themes. 
Preceding these early immigration cases was the orthodox view of foreign affairs. 14 Under 
the orthodox approach, the federal government’s exercise of foreign affairs powers was evaluated 
through the standard analysis of government powers.15 On each of the factors that render foreign 
affairs law exceptional—questions of justiciability, federalism and executive deference—orthodox 
foreign relations law used normal modes of judicial reasoning.16 
This orthodox approach to immigration law was called into question by a mass panic over an 
influx of Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth century.17 The population of Chinese 
immigrants swelled in California and other Western states,18 sparking a national hysteria about the 
alleged risks posed by Chinese immigrants.19 The state legislature of California issued a report to 
the rest of the nation, Chinese Immigration: Its Social, Moral, and Political Effect,20 that detailed 
the supposed risks posed by Chinese immigrants.21 
In response to the national outcry, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act.22 From the 
legislative sidelines, Justice Stephen J. Field, who would later rule on the constitutionality of this 
legislation, encouraged Congress to adopt a restrictive approach towards Chinese immigration.23 
In an interview, he argued that, in the balance of the immigration controversy, was “whether the 
civilization of this coast, its society, morals and industry shall be of American or Asiatic type.”24 
The anti-immigrant panic of Congress, of Justice Field and of the public runs through the 
                                                 
13 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1906. 
14 G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 
(1999). 
15 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1911. 
16 See White, supra note 14, at 9 (concluding that orthodox foreign relations law used a “mode of constitutional 
analysis in foreign relations cases . . . similar to that employed in domestic police power cases”). 
17 Id. at 31. 
18 Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth-Century 
Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 113–14 (2002). 
19 Id. 
20 Special Committee on Chinese Immigration, Report to the Cal. State Senate: Chinese Immigration: its Social, Moral 
and Political Effect (1878), available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/4226138 [hereinafter Chinese 
Immigration]. 
21 For example, the report warned of secret tribunals of Chinese immigrants that provided Chinese law, thus 
“exercis[ing] a despotic sway over one-seventh of the population of the State of California.” Id. at 9. 
22 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600; see also Gabriel 
J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1998) (describing the role that racial animus played in motivating the development of discriminatory 
immigration laws). 
23 Cleveland, supra note 18, at 115. 
24 Id. 
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major immigration decisions of the era: Chae Chan Ping v. United States,25 Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States,26 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States.27 Though decided during a period of a heated 
xenophobia, these three cases continue to provide the foundation for Congress’s broad power in 
the field of immigration.28 
In Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s sovereign power to pass the 
Chinese Exclusion Act.29 Brushing away concerns that there was no direct enumerated power for 
Congress to rely upon, the Court argued that immigration law was distinct from other issues of 
domestic law: 
While under our constitution and form of government the great mass of local matters is 
controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their 
subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, 
the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and 
security throughout its entire territory. The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress 
insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the 
states, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers . . . .30 
Present within the Chae Chan Ping decision are the exceptional approaches towards 
unenumerated power and federalism that characterize both immigration and foreign relations 
exceptionalism today. The Supreme Court was willing to commit to broad, unchecked powers for 
the national government.31 Moreover, the Court held that these powers were exclusive of the states, 
thus denying the states their previously unencumbered role in nineteenth-century immigration.32 
In Nishimura Ekiu, the Court continued to develop the themes of exceptionalism.33 The Court 
disavowed any role in overseeing immigration administration, unless authorized by Congress.34 
The Court’s decision was grounded in concerns about justiciability, since it found that the 
oversight of immigration was given solely to the political branches of government.35 Likewise, the 
Fong Yue Ting Court held that “it is well settled that the provisions of an [immigration statute] 
must be upheld by the courts.”36 This radical conclusion, taken with the rest of the Fong Yue Ting 
decision meant that future Congresses could legislate in immigration however they liked, almost 
fully unburdened by the prospect of judicial review.37 The filings submitted to the Court during 
these decisions indicate the atmosphere of xenophobia from which these decisions emerged.38 The 
                                                 
25 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
26 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
27 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
28 Chin, supra note 22, at 3 (indicating that current Supreme Court immigration decisions base the federal 
government’s authority on the same unenumerated powers that early immigration decisions relied upon). 
29 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See also Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (finding that the power to regulate immigration was exclusively 
federal and did not permit a competing California regime). 
33 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1892). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893). 
37 Id. 
38 Schuck, supra note 3, at 5 (“Unlike the “old” immigrants, who had come to the United States primarily from 
Northern and Western Europe, most of the “new” immigrants came from Southern and Eastern Europe and—until 
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government brief filed in Fong Yue Ting analogized Chinese immigrants to “hordes of barbarians” 
who had come to the United States “to debase our labor and poison the health and morals of the 
communities in which they locate.”39 It is not unlikely that the Court’s marked departure from its 
previous constitutional interpretation was influenced by this pervasive antipathy towards the 
Chinese. 
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had developed a body of 
immigration cases that recognized a difference between domestic and foreign relations cases.40 
These cases held that, when dealing with immigration, the judiciary should adopt a unique 
approach towards questions of justiciability, federalism and inherent powers of sovereignty. Of 
course, at the time, administrative deference was not yet a meaningful concept on the Court, but 
these doctrines would eventually extend into that body of law. 
Notably, this body of doctrine preceded Justice Sutherland’s argument in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright by a full 47 years. As Professor Henkin noted, the Supreme Court decisions 
affirming the Chinese Exclusion Act provided much of the analytical material for Justice 
Sutherland’s delayed “revolution.”41 The next Section describes how Justice Sutherland’s 
scholarship developing foreign relations exceptionalism was informed by, and dependent upon, 
the Supreme Court immigration decisions preceding it. 
B. Justice Sutherland’s Contributions to the Rise of Exceptionalism 
Justice Sutherland, according to Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth, largely initiated a 
“revolution” that brought about the exceptionalist foreign relations regime.42 While the previous 
discussion describes how the revolution, began prior to Justice Sutherland’s time on the bench, the 
present Section describes how Justice Sutherland’s project was not of his own creation—in his 
own writings, it is evident that he was influenced by, and reliant upon, immigration doctrines from 
50 years earlier.43 This Section also briefly reviews the Sutherland Court decisions that furthered 
foreign affairs exceptionalism. 
Justice Sutherland’s work on exceptionalism began before he joined the Court. Writings from 
his career as a senator from Utah reveal both that he was developing a theory of exceptionalism 
and that this theory rested in significant part upon immigration precedent.44 This Section relies 
upon Professor Cleveland’s thorough account of the role of immigration in the development of 
foreign affairs exceptionalism.45 
In 1909, Sutherland published his first book, The Internal and External Powers of the National 
                                                 
their entry was sharply restricted in the 1880’s—from the Orient. This change triggered the explosive passions of 
racial and religious prejudice, fears of revolutionary contagion, class conflict, and other deep-seated 
animosities . . . .”). 
39 Cleveland, supra note 18, at 141–42. 
40 Chinese Immigration, supra note 20, at 7. 
41 Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858 (1987). 
42 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1913. 
43 Henkin, supra note 41, at 858. 
44 GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1916) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND, WORLD 
AFFAIRS]; GEORGE SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1910) 
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS]. 
45 Cleveland, supra note 18, at 141–42. 
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Government.46 He argued for a bifurcation of constitutional powers and analysis between the 
domestic, internal powers of the federal government and foreign, external powers.47 To support 
the notion that the government’s foreign relations powers were broad and unenumerated, 
Sutherland cited the Court’s affirmation of the Chinese Exclusion Act.48 In Constitutional Power 
and World Affairs, the longer, subsequent treatment of his exceptionalist theory, Sutherland 
continued to rely upon the Chinese immigration statutes of the late 1800s as support for his broader 
thesis.49 
Thus, the immigration cases preceding Justice Sutherland’s contributions to foreign relations 
exceptionalism were not merely prescient of future developments. Rather, Chae Chan Ping, Fong 
Yue Ting and Nishimura Ekiu were decided during a formative period in which then-Senator 
Sutherland was developing his attitudes about foreign affairs. While his exceptionalist doctrine is 
not wholly dependent upon the immigration decisions, scholars recognize that it “derived directly” 
from this body of doctrine.50 
After his appointment to the Supreme Court, now-Justice Sutherland “implemented his 
theory”51 for an exceptionalist doctrine through a series of Supreme Court cases—most notably, 
Curtiss-Wright52 and United States v. Belmont.53 
Curtiss-Wright involved the prosecution of a U.S. arms dealer who had violated a prohibition 
on the sale of arms to belligerents in a conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay.54 The prohibition 
arose from a Joint Resolution that Congress passed in 1934 authorizing President Roosevelt to bar 
sales of U.S. commerce to the conflict.55 While the defendants argued that the Joint Resolution 
constituted an unlawful delegation of Congress’ power, the Court held otherwise in a decision 
authored by Justice Sutherland.56 Unlike domestic affairs, in which the Court was expected to 
police separation-of-powers concerns, the Court’s decision was in the sphere of foreign affairs, in 
which greater judicial deference to the executive was warranted.57 To shore up support for his 
exceptionalist interpretation of foreign affairs law, Justice Sutherland cited both to Chae Chan 
Ping and to Fong Yue Ting in the Curtiss-Wright opinion.58 
Much as Curtiss-Wright foreshadowed that deference to the executive would become a 
hallmark of foreign relations exceptionalism, Belmont indicated that dismissal of federalism 
concerns would become another characteristic of the exceptionalist project.59 In Belmont, the 
Supreme Court upheld an agreement between the newly established Soviet Union and the President 
that had not been approved by the Senate despite a conflicting New York state law.60 The Soviet-
                                                 
46 White, supra note 14, at 47. 
47 White, supra note 14, at 47. 
48 SUTHERLAND, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS, supra note 46, at 385. 
49 SUTHERLAND, WORLD AFFAIRS, supra note 44, at 56–57. 
50 Cleveland, supra note 18, at 273. 
51 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1915. 
52 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
53 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
54 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311. 
55 Cleveland, supra note 18, at 3 n.4. 
56 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315. 
57 Id. at 320. 
58 Id. at 317–18. 
59 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1915. 
60 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1937). 
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U.S. agreement had recognized that the Soviet government had colorable claims against American 
parties and the federal government would assume responsibility over the management of those 
claims.61 Despite a New York law that would bar the U.S. government from seizing property held 
within the state, the Court held that any federalism concerns were set aside once the case moved 
upon the foreign affairs field.62 No matter the New York policy, Justice Sutherland argued, “the 
external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies.”63 
With Curtiss-Wright and Belmont, Justice Sutherland set into motion a “striking departure” from 
the orthodox understanding of foreign relations law.64 
C. The Early Cold War Retrenchment 
The revised account of foreign relations exceptionalism recognizes that the foundations of 
exceptionalism, laid by early immigration cases and Justice Sutherland’s subsequent contributions, 
were further strengthened by a set of cases decided during and immediately after World War Two. 
These cases—“some of the most extreme plenary power precedents”—affirmed and extended the 
vitality of the Chinese immigration cases of a half-century earlier.65 This Section reviews how 
these immigration cases—United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy66 and Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei67—strengthened and extended foreign relations exceptionalism. 
These immigration cases are notable for several reasons. At a time of national anxiety, they 
not only reaffirmed the exceptionalism of the Chinese immigration cases, they applied the 
exceptionalism in unqualified terms. 68 One scholar describes these early cases as “the modern 
zenith of the plenary power doctrine in the Court.”69 Moreover, the cases arguably extended the 
inherent plenary power authority from Congress to the executive.70 Finally, they offered early 
instances of the Court affording deference to agency determinations of statutory authority. 
Early Cold War immigration cases reaffirmed the relevance of the Chinese immigration cases 
in no uncertain terms. Knauff reaffirmed the government’s power to exclude aliens as a 
“fundamental act of sovereignty,” citing to both Curtiss-Wright and to Fong Yue Ting in support.71 
With respect to the prospect of due process for non-citizens, the Knauff Court responded 
dismissively: “whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an 
alien denied entry is concerned.”72 Similarly, the Court withdrew the judiciary almost entirely from 
oversight in the administration of immigration law: “reform in this field must be entrusted to the 
                                                 
61 301 U.S. at 326. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 331. 
64 Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 379 
(2000). 
65 Id. 
66 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
67 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
68 Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz 
Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 954 (1995). 
69 Id. 
70 Anne Y. Lee, The Unfettered Executive: Is There An Inherent Presidential Power to Exclude Aliens?, 39 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 239 (2005). 
71 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. 
72 Id. at 544. 
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branches of Government in control of our international relations.”73 Across these early Cold War 
cases, the Court “doubled down” on the traditional themes of foreign relations exceptionalism: 
non-justiciability, rejection of federalism concerns and commitment to inherent powers in the field 
of foreign affairs. 
Knauff is also notable for its slight amendment to the earlier plenary power decisions.74 While 
cases like Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting were centrally concerned with the extent of 
Congress’s power to regulate immigration, Knauff arguably extended the plenary power to the 
executive branch.75 According to the Knauff majority, the exclusion of aliens stems “not alone 
from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the 
nation.”76 
Finally, the early Cold War cases demonstrate preliminary instances of heightened 
administrative deference. While these cases precede Chevron, they offer an initial insight into the 
Court’s heightened deference for administrative determinations involving immigration and foreign 
affairs.77 In Mezei, the Court evaluated whether the ongoing, indefinite detention of an individual 
that the United States government perceived as a security risk was authorized by law.78 The Court 
affirmed the government’s proposed reading of an earlier statute, the Passport Act of 1918, to 
justify the government’s proposed detention of the defendant.79 
An understanding of foreign relations exceptionalism, as developed in immigration law, is 
critically incomplete without an appreciation of how the early Cold War cases developed the 
doctrine. By reaffirming the viability of the earlier Chinese immigration cases, recognizing the 
executive’s inherent plenary powers and demonstrating early instances of heightened 
administrative deference, early Cold War cases contribute to the revised account of foreign 
relations exceptionalism. 
The animus showered upon Chinese immigrants motivated the beginning of the Court’s foray 
into exceptionalism. Early immigration cases like Chae Chan Ping did not create foreign relations 
exceptionalism, but they offered doctrinal resources that could be used to construct the eventual 
doctrine.80 Justice George Sutherland, whose career rise occurred during the anti-Chinese 
immigrant hysteria, expressly relied upon these cases when developing his account of foreign 
affairs exceptionalism.81 In turn, the Supreme Court returned to both the early Chinese immigration 
cases and the Sutherland foreign affairs decisions in a flurry of Cold War cases. This historical 
interrelationship demonstrates that immigration law cannot be understood without reference to 
foreign relations exceptionalism; likewise, exceptionalism cannot be fully appreciated without an 
understanding of immigration law. Given the close relation between immigration and foreign 
relations law, the next Part integrates immigration law into the broader analysis of foreign affairs 
exceptionalism. 
                                                 
73 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 599 (1952). 




78 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953). 
79 Id. 
80 Cleveland, supra note 18, at 4 (finding that Sutherland’s foreign affairs exceptionalism “derived directly” from early 
immigration decisions). 
81 See infra Part I.B. 
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II. EXCEPTIONALIST NORMS IN IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Scholars have treated foreign relations law as exceptional because the Court departed from its 
baseline analytical assumptions when confronted with foreign affairs issues.82 Exceptionalism is 
defined by the Court’s “distinctive functional, doctrinal or methodological analysis.”83 To define 
what renders the Court’s analysis distinctive, it may help to distinguish what does not make foreign 
affairs distinct. Congress’s power to declare war is an aspect of foreign relations law,84 but not 
what makes it distinct.85 There are many enumerated powers involving foreign affairs that do not 
apply to domestic affairs, but it is not these enumerated powers that render the field of law special. 
In crafting this definition, I hew to the useful standard offered by Professors Sitaraman and 
Wuerth.86 
Rather, scholars treat foreign relations law as exceptional because the federal judiciary applied 
a systematically different approach to issues arising in foreign affairs than they did to issues arising 
in domestic affairs. To provide a very general example, a state’s complaint about excessive federal 
authority would be treated differently in the field of foreign affairs than it would in domestic 
affairs.87 This difference in analysis, rather than a difference in the Constitution itself, is what 
renders foreign affairs law exceptional. 
Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth characterize exceptionalism by three central characteristics: 
distinctive approaches to justiciability, federalism and “executive dominance.”88 Justiciability and 
federalism are familiar concepts, “executive dominance,” however, refers to a collection of 
Supreme Court doctrines relating to the executive, including the Court’s deference towards 
executive arguments in foreign affairs and a willingness to acknowledge non-textual bases for the 
President’s powers.89 
Application of Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth’s exceptionalist framework to immigration 
law reveals issues underlying the final prong of their tripartite structure, “executive dominance.” 
What renders immigration law exceptional—and foreign affairs law more generally—is not simply 
that the executive is particularly dominant in this field. Rather, immigration law is exceptional 
because the Court extends significant deference to certain administrative judgments within 
immigration and because the Court acknowledges inherent powers beyond the text of the 
Constitution applicable to both Congress and the Executive. This Part thus divides “executive 
dominance” into two related concepts: administrative deference and inherent powers. 
This Part reviews the exceptionalist approach to justiciability in foreign relations law. Next, 
it turns to federalism: when dealing with questions of foreign affairs law, federal courts have been 
consistently less willing to entertain state claims. Finally, this Part further explores why “executive 
dominance,” standing alone, is unable to account for what renders immigration law exceptional. It 
then applies two factors—administrative deference and inherent power—to foreign relations law. 
                                                 
82 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1908; see also Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Relations Law? 
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1999); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 649, 655 (2002) (describing the unique approach to foreign affairs law as the “foreign affairs differential”).  
83 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1907. 
84 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
85 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1908. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1899. 
89 Id. at 1930–35. 
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Thus, foreign relations law—and by implication, immigration law—has historically been 
exceptional for its unique approach to justiciability, federalism, administrative deference, and 
inherent powers. 
A. Non-Justiciability in Immigration and Foreign Relations Law 
The first prong of foreign affairs exceptionalism is a heightened willingness to find foreign 
affairs issues non-justiciable. Whether by reference to the political question doctrine or the act of 
state doctrine, exceptionalist foreign affairs law avoids addressing issues by rendering them non-
justiciable.90 
The political question doctrine provided the Court with the means to skirt issues of foreign 
relations law. Through reference to the political question doctrine, the Court was able to avoid 
addressing international air travel regulations,91 property claims against a transitional Mexican 
government,92 or the unilateral Presidential termination of a treaty.93 
Likewise, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino94 is illustrative of the Court’s approach 
towards utilizing the act of state doctrine as a means of avoiding ruling on foreign affairs issues. 
The Supreme Court declined to address the validity of a claim to goods that had been seized by 
the Cuban government, since ruling on such an issue would require the court to impose its 
judgment on another sovereign, an area of law best reserved to the political branches.95 
Issues in immigration have been insulated from judicial review through similar application of 
justiciability doctrines. The Supreme Court cited the limited justiciability of immigration issues 
when denying a due process claim relating to a blanket ban on the admission of Chinese migrants96 
or rejecting a challenge to an alien’s indefinite detention on immigration grounds.97 Immigration 
law, as with the rest of foreign relations law, received exceptional treatment from the Court with 
respect to justiciability issues. 
B. Discounting Federalism in Immigration and Foreign Affairs 
States are the unhappy subject of the second characteristic of foreign relations exceptionalism: 
federalism. In foreign relations law, federal courts are less likely to heed state concerns about 
                                                 
90 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1911; White, supra note 14, at 37–38 (describing the shift from orthodox 
foreign affairs law, which applied standard justiciability analyses to foreign affairs law, to exceptional foreign affairs 
law, which was less likely to find foreign legal issues justiciable). 
91 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S&S Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (arguing that “the very nature of 
Executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative”). 
92 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (refusing to evaluate claims against the Mexican government, 
since “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed . . . to  . . . the political departments of the 
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial 
inquiry or decision”) (internal quotations omitted). 
93 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing “the authority of the President in 
the conduct of our country’s foreign relations” as a “nonjusticiable political question”). 
94 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
95 Id. at 427–28. 
96 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that challenges to interpretations of immigration 
statutes are “not questions for judicial determination”). 
97 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (holding that “the power to expel or exclude 
aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune 
from judicial control”). 
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federal activity and are more likely to side with the federal government in any disputes affecting 
this field.98 The salience of state arguments in foreign affairs declined as foreign relations 
exceptionalism became increasingly prominent.99 
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court upheld a presidential directive regarding 
Soviet funds that conflicted with a New York State statute directing the disposition of the funds.100 
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Sutherland, brushed off any suggestion that the interests 
of the state government should affect the Court’s judgment: “the external powers of the United 
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies.”101 Because the foreign relations 
power of the United States was vested in the federal government, which had negotiated a protocol 
for terminating claims against the Soviet state, New York’s interests could not carry the day—or, 
as Justice Sutherland memorably wrote, “as to such purposes, the State of New York does not 
exist.”102 The Court reaffirmed its exceptional approach to federalism in a subsequent decision, 
United States v. Pink,103 which upheld the same presidential directive respecting Soviet assets in 
the face of state opposition.104 
The Supreme Court’s application of exceptionalist logic to deny arguments from federalism 
was as common in immigration law as it was in foreign relations law as a whole. In Hines v. 
Davidowitz,105 the Supreme Court expressly relied upon Belmont in invalidating a state statute that 
taxed and regulated aliens entering Pennsylvania.106 The Court held that the State of Pennsylvania 
could not legislate in a way that interfered with federal immigration activities, since the challenged 
legislation was “in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government 
that from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national 
authority.”107 This decision echoed earlier immigration decisions, which foreshadowed the 
exceptionalist reasoning that would dominate the intersection of foreign affairs and federalism 
law.108 Further demonstrating that foreign affairs exceptionalism and immigration exceptionalism 
are not parallel “exceptionalisms,” but rather intertwined doctrines, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hines was cited in numerous subsequent decisions by the Court evaluating federalism claims in 
                                                 
98 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1915–16 (noting that, by treating foreign affairs as a plenary federal authority, 
“Sutherland’s exceptionalism transformed federalism”); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs 
and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1643 (1997) (finding that challenges to federal foreign affairs activities based 
upon federalism were unsuccessful at the Supreme Court); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Exceptionalism, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1224–25 (1999) (arguing that foreign affairs exceptionalism had a significant impact upon 
federalism and that the end of the Cold War provided an impetus to terminate the exceptional treatment of federalism 
issues). 
99 White, supra note 14, at 115 (noting the rise of exceptionalist approach to foreign affairs law, in which “the states, 
by Sutherland’s account, had ceased to become actors in the realm of constitutional foreign affairs jurisprudence”). 
100 301 U.S. 324, 325–27 (1937). 
101 Id. at 331. 
102 Id. 
103 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
104 Id. at 231 (“[T]he power of a State . . . must give way before the superior Federal policy evinced by a treaty or 
international compact or agreement.”). 
105 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
106 Id. at 59–60. 
107 Id. at 68. 
108 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“For local interests the several states of the Union 
exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one 
power.”). 
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foreign affairs decisions outside of immigration.109 Exceptionalist federalist analysis dominated 
the Supreme Court’s foreign affairs doctrine, both inside and outside of immigration law. 
C. “Executive Dominance,” Understood as Administrative Deference and Inherent Powers 
Under Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth’s characterization of the doctrine, foreign affairs 
exceptionalism’s third trait is “executive dominance.” 110 Executive dominance is not expressly 
defined in their argument, but it rests upon two notions: executive power and administrative 
deference to executive interpretations.111 Intertwining these two concepts may be effective at 
explaining other areas of foreign affairs law, but it is not as helpful in immigration. Indeed, the 
concept of “executive dominance” obscures more than it reveals, for it fails to acknowledge the 
way that notions of federal power in immigration bleed from the President to Congress. This 
section explains why a foreign relations exceptionalism that includes immigration law must 
disentangle these two concepts, evaluating each on its own merits. 
1. Inherent Powers 
A historical oddity of foreign affairs exceptionalism is that Justice Sutherland, who so 
supported the extension of Presidential authority in foreign affairs, was one of the Four Horsemen 
who fought so virulently to oppose the extension of New Deal federal authority.112 While fighting 
against the extension of federal powers in the domestic sphere, Justice Sutherland and other 
members of the Court who supported the Curtiss-Wright, Belmont and other exceptionalist 
decisions were happy to affirm virtually unbounded federal power in the foreign sphere.113 Foreign 
affairs exceptionalism is thus characterized in part by the Court’s willingness to affirm 
unenumerated federal powers. This Section proposes that inherent powers must be understood 
separately from executive dominance, since the inherent powers at issue in immigration reside 
with Congress, rather than the executive. 
The recognition of inherent governmental powers preceded Justice Sutherland. In early 
immigration decisions, the Supreme Court recognized what has come to be known as the “plenary 
power,” a doctrine that recognizes the federal government’s power to regulate immigration as an 
incident of sovereignty.114 While Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth restrict their discussion of 
inherent powers to the executive,115 the plenary power doctrine generally refers to the powers of 
Congress to regulate immigration. 
The plenary power developed in decisions like Fong Yue Ting that preceded Justice 
Sutherland’s tenure on the Court. There, the Court did not search out a specific source of textual 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2289 (2000); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 
432 (1968). 
110 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1930. 
111 Id. at 1931; see also Bradley, supra note 82, at 1092–93 (defining “executive domination” by the Court’s 
recognition of the President’s unconstrained foreign affairs power, its acceptance of presidential “Executive 
agreements” and its deference to executive interpretations of sovereign immunity). 
112 White, supra note 14, at 118 (“Sutherland and other Justices conventionally thought of as opponents of the New 
Deal were perfectly comfortable with the use of an Executive international agreement to confiscate private property 
situated in a state, without any concern for potentially competing state interests . . . .”). 
113 Id. 
114 Motomura, supra note 10, at 551–53 (characterizing the plenary power as founded upon national sovereignty, 
rather than an express constitutional warrant of power). 
115 See supra Part II. 
 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [2017 
104 
authority, such as the Naturalization Clause, to undergird Congress’s power to regulate 
immigration. Rather, the Supreme Court described Congress’s immigration power as deriving 
from the “inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation.”116 The 
Supreme Court continued to rely upon the plenary power to justify congressional activity in 
immigration that was otherwise unsupported by any enumerated basis in the Constitution.117 
The Court’s sovereignty-based description of the plenary power in immigration anticipated 
the inherent executive powers that would be elaborated upon in Curtiss-Wright.118 Citing to Fong 
Yue Ting, Justice Sutherland expressly analogized between Congress’ inherent authority to expel 
aliens and the President’s inherent authority “to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”119 
Likewise, Curtiss-Wright also relied upon Chae Chan Ping, citing the case in support of the 
proposition that sovereignty was passed from Great Britain to the United States collectively, and 
with it, the inherent authority to engage in foreign affairs.120 The Court returned to the 
exceptionalist approach to inherent powers of the early immigration decisions in later cases 
regarding foreign affairs issues unrelated to immigration. Dissenting justices, frustrated by the 
limitation imposed on the President in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,121 would again 
return to the language of Fong Yue Ting in their dissent.122 
Therefore, the inherent authority that foreign affairs exceptionalism recognizes is not simply 
inherent Presidential power, but also inherent congressional powers. As early immigration cases 
held, the inherent powers of sovereignty came to rest both in the executive and legislative 
branches.123 
2. Administrative Deference 
Because Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth’s executive dominance heading is unable to 
contain the exceptionalist approach to inherent power, which involves both Congress and the 
President, inherent power must be separated out into its own issue—leaving administrative 
deference as the remainder within the original category of executive dominance. This section 
reviews the familiar phenomenon of heightened administrative deference with respect to foreign 
affairs issues.124 
The Supreme Court, when reviewing issues of foreign affairs, applies a more substantial form 
                                                 
116 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893). See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 
581, 603–04 (“That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude 
aliens from its territory, is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory 
to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence.”). 
117 Motomura, supra note 10, at 551–53. 
118 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (arguing that “the investment of the federal 
government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution”). 
119 Id. at 319. 
120 Id. at 317. 
121 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
122 Id. at 685 (affirmatively referencing dicta in Fong Yue Ting that recognized unilateral executive power to surrender 
individuals charged with a crime in another country). 
123 See Cleveland, supra note 18. 
124 Much of this discussion draws upon the helpful account of administrative law provided in William N. Eskridge & 
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Statutory Interpretations from Chevron 
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008). 
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of deference to executive determinations: Curtiss-Wright deference.125 In Department of the Navy 
v. Egan,126 for instance, the Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s challenge to the statutory 
authorization for a naval organization that had revoked the respondent’s security clearance.127 
Underlying the Egan decision was the Court’s concerns about intervening in executive 
determinations relating to national security.128 Other questions involving statutory interpretation 
were likewise resolved with “extreme deference” to the federal government.129 
This Curtiss-Wright deference continued into immigration law. In Hiryabashi v. United 
States,130 the Court affirmed the executive’s power, pursuant to congressional affirmation, to order 
a racially discriminatory curfew for Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast.131 In Ex parte 
Republic of Peru, the Supreme Court offered considerable deference to executive findings of 
foreign sovereign immunity.132 
A recent analysis of the Court’s administrative deference doctrine found that the bulk of 
administrative deference decisions that expressly rested on Curtiss-Wright occurred in the context 
of immigration law.133 In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,134 the Court deferred to the 
executive’s interpretation of the Immigration Nationality Act and the United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in finding that the President could order the Coast Guard to 
forcibly return ships with fleeing migrants to Haiti.135 Despite finding that the statute at issue 
allowed the President to suspend the entry of certain aliens—a power not at issue in an order 
dealing with the illegal entry of migrants136—the Court deferred to the executive’s interpretation 
of the statute.137 Citing to Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that heightened deference was appropriate 
when “construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for 
which the President has unique responsibility.”138 Heightened deference, therefore, is an element 
of foreign affairs exceptionalism, applicable alike in the foreign affairs and immigration law. 
If, in the analysis of foreign relations exceptionalism, one takes a step back and perceives 
foreign affairs law broadly enough to include immigration law, it becomes evident that the 
characteristics used to define foreign affairs exceptionalism apply to immigration as well. While 
immigration law, like its siblings in foreign affairs law, shares similarly exceptional approaches to 
federalism and justiciability, the executive dominance prong does not effectively capture what 
renders immigration exceptional. Rather, executive dominance must be disaggregated into two 
                                                 
125 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 124, at 1100–01. 
126 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
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components—inherent power and administrative deference—which better explain the exceptional 
character of immigration and foreign affairs law. 
Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth argue that the elements of foreign affairs that rendered it 
exceptional are increasingly dissolving into a more normalized body of law.139 While much of 
foreign affairs law has lost its exceptionalist character, they contend, they do not thoroughly 
address whether immigration law has also normalized, and if it has, how so. The next Part takes 
up this question. 
III. ABNORMAL NORMALIZATION: HALTING PROGRESS IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
In analyzing normalization, scholars have most closely studied two pillars of foreign relations 
law: national security and foreign affairs law, the law regarding relationships between the U.S. and 
other countries. Immigration law, a third pillar of foreign relations law, has not enjoyed the same 
study from normalization scholarship. This Section provides that attention by contrasting the 
understanding of normalization that Professors Wuerth and Sitaraman offer with the state of 
normalization in immigration law today. As the following Part makes clear, normalization is 
decidedly not normal in the field of immigration law. Progress towards normalization has been 
uneven and halting. Section A describes Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth’s account, which 
describes three waves of normalization in foreign relations law. Section B indicates how these 
waves are inapplicable in the context of immigration law, and reviews the more limited progress 
that normalization has made within immigration law. 
A. Normalization Across Foreign Relations Law 
Under the standard account of foreign relations normalization, the “Sutherland Revolution” 
has been largely negated by a counter-revolution: the normalization of foreign relations law.140 
Over a twenty-five year period, the Court has dismantled the exceptionalist platform upon which 
foreign relations law rested.141 Over the course of three waves of normalization, the Court has 
carried out the project of “eliminating exceptionalist reasoning from foreign relations law.”142 
Strikingly, Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth find that the Court’s normalization project has 
progressed significantly—the progress in normalization is “on par” with Justice Sutherland’s 
accomplishments in developing an exceptionalist understanding.143 After twenty-five years of 
normalizing doctrine from the Supreme Court, foreign relations doctrine has made normalization 
normal and exceptionalism exceptional: “We should now expect “normal” treatment of foreign 
relations issues—and characterize the remaining instances of exceptionalism as outliers. 
Normalization is the new normal.”144 Three waves of normalization eroded foreign relations 
exceptionalism: at the end of the Cold War, during the War on Terror and during the Roberts 
Court.145 The following discussion provides only a brief overview of the cases and scholarship that 
attended each wave; it does not attempt to fully review the supporting authorities that Professors 
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Sitaraman and Wuerth marshal in their argument.146 
1. End of the Cold War 
The first indicator of normalization occurred at the end of the Cold War and was comprised 
by an emerging scholarly critique of foreign relations exceptionalism and a Supreme Court willing 
to challenge the tenets of exceptionalism. Describing “the end of the Cold War and the attendant 
breakup of the Soviet Union” as a “propitious time” for an evaluation of American foreign relations 
law, Professor Bradley outlined a shift from “twentieth-century” foreign affairs law.147 Scholars 
critiqued the special deference to the executive,148 as others criticized foreign relations law’s 
disregard for federalism.149 Although Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth do not go so far as to 
characterize this body of scholarship as expressly encouraging normalization qua normalization, 
it is evidence of a widespread recognition that exceptionalist reasoning in foreign relations was 
not inevitable.150 
For its part, the Supreme Court only “dipped its toe in the waters of normalization.”151 In a 
handful of cases, the Court curtailed non-justiciability and extended federalist reasoning into 
foreign relations law. Thus, Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society152 featured a 
Court unwilling to apply the political question doctrine to an arguably applicable case.153 Similarly, 
the Court trimmed the act of state doctrine in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics 
Corp., International.154 
The Court also paid new attention to federalism issues in foreign relations law. For instance, 
in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California,155 the Court upheld a state statute 
requiring global reporting for large corporations from a challenge that it was preempted by an 
executive policy concerning taxation of international corporations.156 Likewise, the Court refused 
to apply traditionally exceptionalist reasoning in a separate case regarding preemption of a 
Massachusetts state law imposing sanctions upon Burma.157 
In short, “momentum was gaining” for normalization. 158 This early scholarship and Supreme 
Court case law did not terminate exceptionalism, but it was sufficient for Professors Sitaraman and 
Wuerth to mark a turn in the doctrine. 159 
  
                                                 
146 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1919–35. 
147 Bradley, supra note 82, at 1089–91. 
148 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 195 (2d ed. 1996). 
149 Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 461 (1998). 
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152 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
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2. War on Terror 
The second wave of normalization, occurring during the War on Terror, was marked by 
increased critiques from the legal academy about the viability of the doctrine of foreign relations 
exceptionalism and by a Court that was surprisingly unwilling to go along with exceptionalist 
arguments from the government in the midst of the War on Terror. 
Scholars reviewed the string of Supreme Court cases limiting the executive detention of 
individuals held in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. 160 Given the Court’s willingness to buck the 
executive’s claims of authority, the cases provided support for scholars arguing for normalization 
in the field of detention,161 administrative law162 and state privilege.163 
The Supreme Court’s decisions during this period served to normalize claims of executive 
power and non-justiciability alike. In Rasul v. Bush164 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,165 the Court denied 
government arguments that the Court should defer to executive prerogatives regarding detention 
of combatants.166 Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 167 the Court rebuked the government’s 
argument that the case was non-justiciable.168 It went on to reject the executive’s interpretation of 
a contested statute relating to detention.169 Finally, the Court rejected foreign relations 
exceptionalism throughout its decision in Boumediene v. Bush.170 
Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth note that this second wave of normalization is particularly 
significant given the context in which the Court reached its decisions. 171 The War on Terror 
represented “the strongest possible challenge to the normalization project” and yet the Court 
continued to withdraw exceptionalist reasoning from the areas of non-justiciability, federalism and 
executive deference.172 Again, the War on Terror wave did not fully excise exceptionalism from 
foreign affairs, though the cases demonstrated that “the trend toward normalization was 
unmistakable.”173 
3. Roberts Court 
Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth provide their most extended treatment of normalization 
during the Roberts Court, given that this period has not received the same critical treatment that 
                                                 
160 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1922–23. 
161 Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 
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the previous two waves already enjoyed.174 As in the previous two waves, the third wave of 
normalization features a marked departure from previous reliance upon exceptionalist reasoning 
with respect to non-justiciability, federalism and executive deference issues.175 
The Roberts Court has increasingly normalized its approach to foreign relations justiciability. 
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I),176 Chief Justice Roberts led a six-member majority in 
rejecting the government’s argument that the political question doctrine rendered a dispute 
between Congress and the President over the issuance of passports non-justiciable.177 Faced with 
a dispute between Congress and the State Department over the status of Israeli control over 
Jerusalem, the Supreme Court described the controversy as “a familiar judicial exercise”—hardly 
language consistent with an exceptionalist posture.178 
The Supreme Court also made progress in normalizing its foreign relations case law, as 
applied to questions of federalism.179 The Court’s decision in Bond v. United States180 insisted 
upon a “clear statement rule” for statutes implementing treaties that impinged upon areas of state 
police power.181 Specifically, the Court required that Congress provide a “clear indication” that 
the statute implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention applies to purely local activities. 182 
Such a requirement reflects a concern for federalism that was expressly rejected in earlier 
exceptionalist decisions. 183 
Finally, the Roberts Court’s normalization project cabined formerly expansive claims of 
executive prerogative.184 Medellín v. Texas,185 which concerned an executive order intended to 
implement provisions of the Vienna Convention, marked a defeat for claims of executive power.186 
The Court was unwilling to concede that the executive possessed the power to unilaterally 
authorize the implementation of a non-self-executing treaty.187 
Likewise, the Court rejected arguments for executive deference in Morrison188 and Kiobel.189 
In Morrison, the Court declined to adopt the executive’s evaluation of whether the Securities 
Exchange Act applied abroad.190 Similarly, in Kiobel, the Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to the Alien Tort Statute.191 
While Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth note that the executive is likely the more competent 
institution to assess the foreign consequences of the extraterritorial application of statutes, neither 
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case afforded the executive special deference in determining the reach of the statutes at hand.192 
Thus, Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth argue that the Roberts Court’s foreign relations 
decisions advance normalization. On each of justiciability, federalism and executive power, as 
considered in the field of foreign relations, the Roberts Court’s decisions align with a broader 
twenty-five year trajectory of normalization.193 
B. Limited Normalization in Immigration Law 
Despite the optimistic report for foreign relations law, normalization has not proceeded apace 
in immigration law. Unlike the depiction of foreign relations normalization that Professors 
Sitaraman and Wuerth offer, immigration normalization has occurred only haltingly—or not at all. 
Moreover, the three waves of normalization used originally do not at all illuminate the trajectory 
of normalization in immigration. This section, rather than attempt an organization by chronological 
period, arranges its discussion of normalization by each of the exceptionalist factors.194 
1. Justiciability 
While foreign relations exceptionalism originally entailed an immigration law that was largely 
perceived as non-justiciable, this exceptionalist approach has since changed. In a break from its 
exceptionalist past, courts increasingly view immigration law as amenable to judicial review. 
Recent scholarship notes both the exceptional character of justiciability analysis in immigration 
law and its normalization, though it does not employ these precise terms.195 Professor Legmosky 
noted that “immigration policy and judicial review have always had a kind of oil-and-water 
relationship . . . . Those judges who incline even slightly toward trepidation might regard 
immigration, with its potential foreign affairs implications, as an especially treacherous arena to 
enter.”196 Professor Abrams also noted the manner in which immigration law’s position within the 
broader body of foreign relations law produced an exceptional approach to justiciability.197 
However, immigration law scholars have reached similar conclusions to Professors Sitaraman 
and Wuerth: the non-justiciability that characterized foreign relations exceptionalism was 
beginning to shift, albeit slightly. For example, Professor Schuck notes that “the courts’ almost 
complete deference to Congress and the immigration authorities . . . is beginning to give way to a 
new understanding . . . of judicial role.”198 Likewise, Professor Legomsky argues that “the 
suggestion . . . that courts had literally no power to review the constitutionality of Congress’s 
actions” has given way to “the possibility of some judicial role in assessing the constitutionality 
of federal immigration statutes.”199 
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193 Id. at 1935. 
194 For an argument that the most recent Supreme Court cases in immigration reveal a normalizing immigration law, 
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Recent immigration case law confirms that immigration exceptionalism is indeed giving way 
to an increased willingness to find such issues justiciable. The Court confronted immigration 
exceptionalism by reaching out to address issues that the blunt language of Knauff and Mezei 
would otherwise forbid. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,200 the Court considered a suit brought by citizen-
plaintiffs alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights based upon the executive’s exclusion 
of an alien.201 The Court held that the executive needed to marshal a “facially legitimate and bona 
fide reason” for excluding an alien in order to avoid such a challenge. While hardly a dramatic 
step, Kleindienst normalizes immigration law by imposing a standard for whether judicial review 
applies; to be sure, a low standard, but it marked a new willingness to engage questions arising 
from immigration law.202 
Likewise, in Fiallo v. Bell,203 the Supreme Court challenged provisions of the federal 
immigration statute that denied preferential immigration status to the illegitimate children of 
American citizen-fathers, as opposed to the illegitimate children of American citizen-mothers.204 
While the Court affirmed the statutory language, it characterized the judicial role more broadly 
than early precedents.205 Thus, the Court enjoyed a “limited scope of judicial inquiry into 
immigration legislation,” rather than no review at all.206 The Court also expressly rejected the 
government’s argument that immigration was not subject to judicial review.207 Justice Marshall, 
writing in dissent, noted that he was “pleased” to see the Court depart from “the old immigration 
cases that reflect an absolute ‘hands-off’ approach by this Court.”208 
Like other areas of foreign affairs law, immigration law is hardly a “normal” body of law with 
respect to non-justiciability. However, in narrow and specific ways, it is slowly normalizing: the 
Supreme Court is increasingly willing to contest those “old immigration cases”209 that foreclosed 
judicial review. 
2. Federalism 
Courts persist in treating questions of federalism in immigration law differently than in other 
areas of law. This discussion reviews the differential treatment of federalism within immigration 
law. 
Immigration law, unlike other areas of public law, offers little heed to the interests of states. 
Scholars recognize that immigration is essentially “an exclusively federal power . . . because it has 
the potential to influence foreign affairs.”210 As Professor Abrams argues, immigration law 
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continues to place “a very heavy thumb . . . on the government’s side of the scale” when faced 
with federalism-based challenges.211 Plyler v. Doe212 and Arizona v. United States,213 two Supreme 
Court decisions, affirm Professor Abrams’ characterization: normalization of federalism concerns 
in immigration remains a distant objective. 
In Plyler, the Supreme Court considered a class action challenge brought on behalf of 
schoolchildren who were living in Texas without admission by immigration authorities.214 The 
class action challenged a state statute excluding unlawfully present school-age children from 
attending Texas’ schools. While the Court ultimately struck down the Texas statute as a violation 
of Equal Protection Clause, it also addressed the state’s interest in regulating the flow of 
undocumented immigrants through its territory.215 While the Court affirmed the federal role in 
regulating immigration, the Court also found that “only rarely are [immigration] matters relevant 
to legislation by a state.”216 “Rarely” is more than “never,” of course, suggesting a slight loosening 
of the standard announced in early immigration cases like Chy Lung.217 
The Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Arizona also affirms an exclusive federal role—
while including dicta favorable to future federalism-based arguments in immigration. In 
Arizona,218 the State of Arizona appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to affirm the injunction of 
its recent immigration statute.219 At issue in the statute, S.B. 1070, were four provisions: the first 
and second provisions established new criminal penalties for aliens who violated state and federal 
immigration laws, the third and fourth authorized law enforcement officers to carry out additional 
immigration enforcement activities.220 The Supreme Court held that the federal immigration 
scheme preempted three of the four provisions, while remanding the fourth provision for further 
review by lower courts.221 
While the Court sided largely with the federal government in finding that Arizona’s attempt 
to regulate immigration was preempted, the Court acknowledged the State’s “understandable 
frustrations.”222 Moreover, the approach that the Court took to find that Arizona’s program was 
preempted was not so exceptional in character: the Court undertook a careful preemption analysis 
between the state and federal statutes, even finding that one of the provisions was not preempted.223 
A more exceptionalist approach to immigration federalism would have held the whole of 
immigration law to be beyond the powers of the states. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, argued for a more thorough normalization of 
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federalism’s role in immigration.224 Analogizing between Medellin, in which the Court rejected 
the government’s argument for special foreign affairs consideration, and Arizona, Justice Scalia 
wrote: “[in Medellin] we rejected [the government’s] request, as we should reject the Executive’s 
invocation of foreign-affairs considerations here. Though it may upset foreign powers—and even 
when the Federal Government desperately wants to avoid upsetting foreign powers—the States 
have the right to protect their borders against foreign nationals, just as they have the right to execute 
foreign nationals for murder.”225 Not only does Arizona demonstrate that foreign affairs federalism 
is experiencing flickers of federalism normalization, Justice Scalia’s dissent indicates that the 
Court is cognizant of immigration law’s interrelationship with broader trends of normalization. 
Nonetheless, normalization in immigration federalism remains nascent. While Plyler and 
Arizona provide only initial steps towards change, they indicate that the treatment of federalism 
within immigration law remains deeply exceptional. 
3. Inherent Governmental Powers 
In a recent decision, Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),226 the Supreme Court dismissed the 
Executive’s argument that it possessed “broad, undefined powers over foreign affairs” as 
unnecessary dicta of the Curtiss-Wright decision.227 The case, which dealt with whether the 
Congress or the Executive possessed the power to recognize governments through passport 
determinations, ultimately vested the Executive with the power.228 The majority concluded that 
the Executive possessed an exclusive recognition power through the textual commitment of the 
Receptions Clause.229 Zivotofsky II expressly declines to adopt an argument for executive authority 
based upon inherent, unenumerated power in favor of authority based upon an express 
Constitutional delegation of responsibility. Such a shift from the inherent, sovereigntist 
understanding of government power in foreign affairs to a more modern textual, enumerated 
understanding represents a normalizing tendency.230 
However, it is difficult to imagine the Supreme Court making a comparable transition in the 
context of immigration. Here, it is Congress, not the executive, which generally makes a claim of 
inherent authority over foreign affairs grounded in sovereignty itself.231 This plenary power, the 
near-absolute power identified in Chae Chan Ping and elsewhere, remains a constant trope in the 
Court’s discussion of federal immigration law.232 While other elements of immigration 
exceptionalism—justiciability, federalism and administrative deference—refers to differences of 
degree from the rest of public law, the plenary power represents a difference of kind. It is 
exceptional for the Court to entertain claims of inherent, unenumerated and unlimited power from 
branches of the federal government. Normalizing this aspect of law would require a tectonic shift 
in how the Court justifies the activities of the federal government in the field of immigration. 
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Rather than adopt this approach, the Court has undermined the plenary power through the use 
of “phantom constitutional norms.”233 According to Professor Motomura, phantom norms serve as 
a subtext for otherwise curious decisions in statutory interpretation and executive deference.234 
Because the Court will not directly confront the unbounded plenary power, it trims the edges of 
the power through the use of phantom norms that buffer its harshest consequences.235 All the same, 
the persistent use of the plenary power as the justification for government activity in the field of 
immigration ensures that immigration law will remain exceptional in this respect. 
There are alternatives available to the Court with respect to justifying immigration law. The 
Court, in several cases, embraced some initial efforts to develop an alternative rationale. Consider 
the following from Plyler: 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.” . . . Drawing upon this power, upon its plenary authority with respect to 
foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to 
close its borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admission to our 
Nation and status within our borders.236 
While scholars continue to call for the Court to “disavow the plenary power doctrine,” 237 the 
Court has not yet taken this step. Rather, the Court continues to maintain doctrine that vests the 
government with power to regulate immigration through an unenumerated, plenary power 
framework established by nineteenth-century Supreme Court doctrine. Normalization of the 
Court’s review of the inherent powers underlying immigration would require discarding the 
plenary power and finding a new basis for Congress’s regulation of immigration. Here, 
normalization remains a distant goal. 
4. Administrative Deference 
Whereas the evidence of normalization in other aspects of immigration law is slight at best, 
the Court’s application of traditional administrative deference norms reflects greater evidence of 
normalization. Indeed, the normalization of the judiciary’s approach to administrative law in 
immigration is evinced by the fact that there is no one approach. Rather than maintain a 
consistently deferential approach grounded in the recognition of potential effects upon foreign 
affairs, the Court applies differing levels of deference to immigration decisions based upon their 
proximity to truly foreign concerns. 
Using a framework for analyzing administrative deference developed in Professor Eskridge 
and Baer’s analysis of administrative deference doctrine, we can group the Supreme Court’s 
deference towards immigration cases into two categories.238 The Supreme Court either offers 
                                                 
233 Motomura, supra note 10, at 567. 
234 Id. at 610–11. 
235 Id. (“[C]ourts will continue to avoid this directly applicable constitutional doctrine through subconstitutional 
decisions that rely on phantom constitutional norms much more favorable to aliens. Cases that purport to speak only 
subconstitutionally have become the indirect expression of an alternative body of constitutional immigration law in 
which the plenary power doctrine has lost much of its force.”). 
236 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). 
237 Motomura, supra note 10, at 610. See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 303 (calling for “a judicial willingness . . . to cut away at the notion 
of plenary Congressional power over immigration”). 
238 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 124, at 1099–1100. 
 
Vol. 15:1] Mac LeBuhn 
115 
standard-to-exceptional deference to the decisions of immigration agencies or it offers no 
deference-to-anti-deference.239 This bifurcation of the Court’s approach to administrative 
deference in immigration suggests that the Court’s decisions on immigration deference are 
sensitive to the content of the agency determination. As a result, issues with colorable risks of 
international blowback receive exceptional deference,240 while cases raising human rights 
concerns—notably, within criminal law—receive either no deference or anti-deference.241 This 
Section reviews these two approaches and elaborates upon their relationship to the normalization 
of immigration law. 
a. Standard-to-Exceptional Deference 
Exceptional deference is the extremely heightened deference the Court pays to administrative 
decisions involving foreign affairs.242 The Court’s decision to employ exceptional deference is 
often marked through citation to Curtiss-Wright, though exceptional deference may also rest upon 
an implicit reliance on the principles of the case.243 The close relationship between immigration 
and foreign affairs is belied by the fact that over half of the instances in which the Court invoked 
Curtiss-Wright in an administrative deference case occurred in the context of immigration.244 A 
review of the Court’s administrative law cases involving immigration indicate that it can offer a 
uniquely deferential standard. 
Consider INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre245 for an illustration of the exceptional deference the Court 
pays to certain immigration cases. In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, which 
had concluded that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had wrongly interpreted the phrase 
“serious nonpolitical crime” in a deportation decision.246 The BIA’s finding that the defendant had 
committed such a crime rendered the defendant ineligible for a suspension of his deportation.247 
In affirming the BIA’s interpretation of “serious nonpolitical crime,” the Court noted that “judicial 
deference . . . is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials exercise 
especially sensitive questions that implicate questions of foreign relations.”248 In defending its 
decision to extend deference beyond that which Chevron calls for, the Court noted that the 
judiciary was “not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood 
and importance of such diplomatic repercussions.”249 
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On the whole, immigration issues that raised foreign affairs questions continue to receive 
strong administrative deference. This habit of deference indicates that foreign relations 
exceptionalism carries on across numerous Court decisions at the intersection of immigration and 
administrative law.250 
b. No Deference-to-Anti-Deference 
Unfortunately for immigration agencies, the Supreme Court does not always consider 
administrative deference to be “especially appropriate” for its determinations.251 In decisions 
involving immigrant rights, often in criminal law, the Court either drops any reference to 
administrative deference or applies so-called “anti-deference” through heightened scrutiny of 
agency determinations.252 Intersections of immigration and criminal law often trigger this lower 
standard of deference. In a recent decision, Moncrieffe v. Holder,253 the Supreme Court rejected 
the government’s argument supporting deportation of the defendant.254 The BIA’s approach 
towards interpreting whether the defendant committed an “aggravated felony,” as defined by 
statute, was reversed by the Court.255 The decision reached by the majority in Moncrieffe does not 
reference any administrative deference scheme whatsoever. Indeed, the decision is arguably 
influenced by a concern about the prospect of deportation-as-a-punishment for undeserving 
defendants—a rule of lenity principle.256 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s deference in immigration cases swings between strong deference 
for agency determinations that implicate foreign affairs and no deference for decisions raising 
other issues. The persistence of strong administrative deference for those immigration decisions 
particularly raising foreign relations concerns is exceptional; however, the willingness to forgo a 
categorical foreign affairs deference posture may be evidence of some normalization. As with 
earlier factors, immigration law is often exceptional with respect to administrative law questions, 
though there is some evidence of normalization. 
Normalization, if it is taken to include immigration law, is not a substantially completed 
project. Across the domains of justiciability, federalism, inherent powers and administrative 
deference, foreign affairs exceptionalism continues to strongly shape the Court’s decisions. 
Foreign affairs law, viewed with immigration as a component, has not consistently normalized in 
the manner that Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth propose.257 
Normalization also does not fit as neatly into the three waves that Professors Sitaraman and 
Wuerth characterize. The three waves used in their original article—at the end of the Cold War, 
during the War on Terror and during the Roberts Court—perhaps reflects Professors Sitaraman 
and Wuerth’s emphasis upon national security and war powers throughout their argument. 
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Including immigration in this narrative disrupts this neat historical progression, inviting a 
reconsideration of the utility of the three-stage framework currently employed. 
Although it is not accurate to say that immigration law is normalized, it is also inaccurate to 
say that immigration law has remained static over the past four decades. Indeed, the body of law 
has changed, as the Court and the rest of the federal judiciary pay far more attention to the rights 
of immigrants than was previously the case. The next section deals with how an immigrants’ rights 
framework for evaluating immigration law has normalized immigration law by challenging 
specific areas of exceptionalism, rather than the doctrine of exceptionalism generally. 
IV. RIGHTS NORMALIZATION IN IMMIGRATION 
What explains immigration law’s uneven normalization? Unlike the picture described by 
Professors Wuerth and Sitaraman, immigration normalization has not occurred as fully or as 
thoroughly as it has in foreign relations law. This Part proposes that immigration normalization is 
best understood as a process of rights normalization: areas that were once considered exceptional 
foreign relations questions are increasingly normalized when a contrary decision could implicate 
immigrants’ rights. 258 
Of course, any immigration issue can be said to affect the rights of immigrants in some way. 
However, as the following review of cases suggests, the Court appears ready to intervene on behalf 
of immigrants when it identifies a rights-related matter is in the foreground of a case. When those 
rights questions are not as pronounced, the process of rights normalization is not as likely to occur. 
Distinguishing between cases that are related to rights and those that are not is a matter of degree, 
not a matter of kind. 
Rights normalization occurs in immigration through a number of different channels. 
Immigration exceptionalism has weakened through immigrants’ rights arguments resting on the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, which Section A reviews; and through 
arguments resting on international human rights norms, which Section B reviews. 
A. Applying Constitutional Protections to Immigrants 
Given that immigration involves relations between foreign sovereigns, the federal 
government’s regulation of immigration is a plenary power, the Court originally concluded, and it 
allows very little judicial review. Yet, the application of constitutional protections has weakened 
the position of immigration exceptionalism. Increasingly, the Court is increasingly likely to apply 
constitutional rights analysis to immigration law, through the use of equal protection and due 
process norms. 
1. Equal Protection 
While distinctions based upon race or gender are all but eliminated from the rest of the Federal 
Code, immigration law continues to treat both citizens and aliens differently based upon both of 
these characteristics. Distinctions on both of these axes have long been permitted by reference to 
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the foreign relations character of immigration, but a spate of Supreme Court decisions abruptly 
challenged this posture. While the Court first skirted the intersection of racial equal protection 
issues in Jean v. Nelson,259 it chose to embrace equal protection issues relating to sex in two 
subsequent cases: Miller v. Albright260 and INS v. Nguyen.261 
In Jean, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, narrowly avoided addressing 
whether a policy in which Haitians, unlike other undocumented aliens at the time, were 
automatically detained and excluded, rather than receiving temporary parole.262 The Haitian 
plaintiffs alleged that they were being denied parole on the basis of race and national origin in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.263 While the Eleventh Circuit had held that the 
Government’s plenary power rendered an equal protection argument unavailing, the Supreme 
Court declined to reach the question. Rather, it remanded the case to determine whether the policy 
with regard to Haitian migrants was administered according to regulations.264 Justice Marshall, 
writing in dissent, stated that the proper question was whether “the Government may discriminate 
on the basis of race and national origin even in the absence of any reasons closely related to 
immigration concerns.”265 To Justice Marshall, the Constitution “clearly” provided that the 
Government could not discriminate in this way.266 While Jean represented an opportunity for the 
Court to clarify the role of equal protection analysis in immigration, the Court ultimately declined 
the invitation. 
In Miller and Nguyen, the Court finally chose to apply the Equal Protection Clause to 
immigration law.267 Unlike Jean, which dealt with the equal protection implications of racial 
classifications, Miller and Nguyen dealt with sex classifications. Professor Spiro notes the 
significance of the Supreme Court’s decision to adopt the familiar gender-based classification 
analysis for immigration law “without any alteration of the test to account for the immigration 
context.”268 Similarly, Professors Pillard and Aleinikoff described the significance of the shift from 
a foreign relations framework to a rights framework. The Equal Protection Clause cases “[do] more 
than cast doubt on sex-based citizenship laws. [They force] fundamental reconsideration of the 
plenary power doctrine.”269 
Both Miller and Nguyen analyzed the same provision of the immigration statute. At issue was 
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a statutory requirement that established a different set of requirements for U.S. citizen-fathers of 
children born out of wedlock to secure citizenship for their children than the requirements for 
citizen-mothers.270 Miller, the first case in which the Court addressed the issue, produced a 
splintered Court. Professors Pillard and Aleinikoff noted that, in spite of the divided Court opinion, 
“no majority endorsed the statute’s constitutionality as a matter of equal protection . . . . Not a 
single Justice embraced the government’s suggestion that Ms. Miller was an alien lacking any 
Fifth Amendment rights.”271 Although the Court did not strike down the provision at issue as 
unconstitutional, its willingness to apply equal protection norms marked a significant shift in how 
the Court perceived justiciability, executive deference and inherent powers norms in immigration 
law.272 
Addressing a gender-discrimination claim in the context of immigration shows the Court’s 
willingness to disregard earlier doctrines of non-justiciability. While the Government’s brief in 
Nguyen argued that the right to admit was “exercised by the Executive and Legislative Branches, 
not by the Judiciary,”273 the Court maintained its oversight over gender-discriminatory 
immigration decisions. 
Although federalism was not an issue before the Nguyen Court, the Court did have the 
opportunity to consider the plenary power. The Court, in evaluating the Equal Protection claim 
prior to its abbreviated and inconclusive treatment of the plenary power doctrine, clearly had an 
opportunity, which it chose not to take, of side-stepping the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause altogether. The Court’s deliberate unwillingness to use the plenary power as an excuse to 
avoid the gender-based analysis shows a Court less willing to defer to plenary power arguments.274 
Though the Supreme Court also affirmed the constitutionality of the statute in Nguyen, its 
decision to evaluate the case through an unambiguous gender-classification analysis was 
remarkable.275 The Court’s analysis of the provision evaluated whether the statute furthered an 
“important interest” in a manner that was “tailored” to that interest—the familiar standard for 
gender-based classification that the Court would use in any other body of law.276 
What is remarkable about both decisions is that the Court largely skips over the impacts on 
foreign affairs that one might imagine arising from invalidating this portion of the INA. Rather 
than attend to the traditional elements of foreign relations doctrine—justiciability, executive 
deference and inherent powers are all relevant arguments in this decision—the Court’s attention 
was focused much more closely on the rights of the immigrants at issue in each case. 
2. Due Process 
While the Supreme Court has recognized that some due process protections are available to 
aliens since the 1903 decision in Yamataya v. Fisher,277 the procedural due process protections 
afforded were more formal than real.278 However, the Supreme Court’s initial reluctance gave way 
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to a willingness to entertain individual claims of due process right, especially in the previous thirty 
years.279 Today, an alien seeking to enter the United States may challenge a decision to exclude280 
and an alien facing deportation may challenge indefinite detention pending deportation.281 These 
extensions of procedural due process illustrate the manner in which due process norms have 
bloomed within immigration doctrine. 
When the Court originally applied the Due Process Clause to immigration, the application 
was a limited one. In Yamataya, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a Japanese individual who 
had been in the United States could claim due process protections regarding an exclusion order.282 
The Court held that due process had been satisfied in the exclusion hearing, despite the fact that 
the individual had not received notice of the hearing, could not speak English and did not 
understand the subject of the hearing.283 Given the way that the plenary power doctrine crowded 
out meaningful due process norms in Yamataya, Professor Motomura characterized this as a 
“formal exception to the plenary power,” rather than a protection with any “real content.”284 
The Supreme Court’s early Cold War decisions largely ratified the Yamataya approach. In 
Mezei, the Court held that Mezei, an alien returning from Eastern Europe, could be excluded on 
the basis of whatever process Congress saw fit, establishing the same exceedingly low threshold 
as Yamataya.285 The Mezei Court paid due to traditional norms of non-justiciability and deference 
to inherent powers by holding that a returning alien “has only such rights as Congress sees fit to 
grant in exclusion proceedings.”286 This holding stood without challenge for several decades. 
However, in Plasencia,287 the Supreme Court held that an alien resident returning to the 
United States could challenge her exclusion hearing using the Due Process Clause. Moreover, the 
Court directly applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing factors to the immigration hearing,288 
thus using the same due process analysis as other areas of domestic law.289 While the alien at issue 
in Plasencia was in a similar position to the Mezei litigant—a resident alien on the threshold of 
the United States—the Court’s due process reasoning changed dramatically.290 
Central to the Court’s reasoning in Plasencia were the alien’s ties to the United States. A 
returning resident alien had a stronger due process claim, recognizing that “once an alien gains 
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his 
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constitutional status changes accordingly.”291 This emphasis on individual ties replaced the Mezei 
Court’s formalistic emphasis on foreign relations.292 
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has continued to extend the scope of due process 
protections available to aliens in detention. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the 
Government could not indefinitely detain an individual pending a deportation.293 Notably, the 
Court only devoted two sentences to the role that foreign relations played in its decision: 
The sole foreign policy consideration the Government mentions here is the concern lest 
courts interfere with “sensitive” repatriation negotiations. But neither the Government nor the 
dissents explain how a habeas court’s efforts to determine the likelihood of repatriation, if 
handled with appropriate sensitivity, could make a significant difference in this respect.294 
Rather than reach the due process considerations after struggling through arguments of 
inherent power and non-justiciability, the Supreme Court sidelined the role that foreign relations 
played in Zadvydas.295 As Professor Spiro notes, the Court’s decision “seems to have stepped out 
of the discourse of immigration exceptionalism.”296 
Rather, the Supreme Court re-read the immigration statute to require a “reasonable time” 
limitation that barred the federal government from holding detainees indefinitely.297 The Supreme 
Court reached this reading through reference to Zadvydas’ Fifth Amendment liberty interest.298 
The Supreme Court thus thrust an alien’s quasi-Fifth Amendment rights into the core of a case 
nominally addressing statutory interpretation issues.299 
Two years after Kim and four after Zadvydas, the Supreme Court re-applied a newly 
heightened Due Process Clause review to the ongoing detention of a Cuban individual who arrived 
in Florida during the Mariel boatlift. In Clark v. Martinez,300 the Supreme Court rejected the 
Government’s argument that the alien’s ongoing detention prior to deportation, which exceeded 
six months, was consistent with the Due Process Clause.301 As in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court 
briefly addressed the foreign relations arguments that were previously dominant in immigration 
law: “The Government fears that the security of our borders will be compromised if it must release 
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into the country inadmissible aliens who cannot be removed. If that is so, Congress can attend to 
it.”302 An increased emphasis on individual rights, made concrete through the Due Process Clause, 
produced more normalization in justiciability, deference and inherent powers areas of the foreign 
relations law than a broad review of immigration law otherwise predicts. 
B. Applying International Human Rights Norms to Immigration 
The role of immigration exceptionalism is challenged both by the rise of constitutional norms, 
reviewed in the previous Section, and the rise of international human rights norms, discussed in 
this Section. Much as constitutional arguments have displaced the framework of immigration as 
foreign relations with respect to issues like due process and equal protection claims, international 
human rights norms, codified through national treaties, have further eroded the commitments of 
immigration exceptionalism. 
Less than three decades ago, leading scholars dismissed the role that international human 
rights law could play in changing immigration law. Professor Henkin, writing on the continuing 
influence of Chae Chan Ping and other early plenary power cases, noted that “international human 
rights law has developed to help prevent such harms, but the executive branch has not seen fit to 
respect this law, and the courts have not yet ordered the executive to do so.”303 The role of 
international human rights law in immigration law since then has changed dramatically: 
immigration lawyers increasingly have a facility in wielding international human rights law before 
courts304 and courts increasingly recognize such arguments.305 
Likewise, Justice Stephen Breyer, speaking before the American Society of International Law, 
reflected on the increasingly relevance of international human rights norms in immigration law.306 
Describing an “ever-stronger consensus . . . on the importance of protecting basic human rights,” 
Justice Breyer applauded the manner in which international treaties and national judiciaries 
collaborated in advancing common human rights norms across national boundaries.307 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have both sought to weaken immigration 
exceptionalism through the application of international human rights legal standards.308 INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonesca309 concerned the appeal of an alien seeking status as a refugee for fear of 
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persecution if she were returned to Nicaragua.310 At issue was whether the agency should apply a 
“well-founded fear” standard, as the alien proposed, or the more stringent “clear probability” 
standard, as the Government argued.311 
The Court interpreted the INA with an eye towards the United Nations Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.312 In determining the proper standard for an individual’s refugee claim, the 
Court’s analysis was shaped by the Protocol, as well as additional guidance offered by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.313 Finally, the Court also described its concern 
regarding the possibility that aliens, like the plaintiff, would be “subject to death or persecution if 
forced to return to his or her home country.”314 
A more recent application of human rights law to immigration arises in Cabrera-Alvarez v. 
Gonzales.315 While the Ninth Circuit ultimately sided with the Government against the alien’s 
challenge, the decision is notable because the court did not resist the application of an international 
human rights agreement to the interpretation of domestic immigration law.316 At issue was whether 
the properly considered the interest of children as required by the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child317 when determining whether the deportation of a parent-alien would 
produce “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”318 The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child required that the Government weigh a child’s best interests as a “primary consideration” and 
the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” 
weighed the interests appropriately.319 
The advent of international human rights cases in immigration law demonstrate a federal 
judiciary more willing to hear cases than the plenary power doctrine would otherwise admit. The 
Court shows less deference to executive interpretations and less willingness to kowtow to the 
obligations of the plenary power doctrine. Normalization is not afoot everywhere in immigration 
law, but it appears much more active in the areas rights are implicated. 
What explains the willingness to normalize immigration law in these areas, while allowing 
deeply exceptional cases to persist in most other areas of immigration law? Part IV suggests that 
rights normalization explains the difference. As a descriptive argument, rights normalization holds 
that normalization proceeds more quickly in cases in which the rights of immigrants are at the 
forefront than in other cases. 
Consider justiciability concerns: while courts are discouraged from intervening in foreign 
affairs issues between sovereigns, courts are encouraged to protect the rights of immigrant 
minorities. While immigration law qua foreign relations law continues to entail unique approaches 
to justiciability, federalism, administrative deference and inherent powers, the exceptionalist 
posture weakens significantly once immigration law is no longer viewed as a subset of foreign 
affairs law. On net, immigration law becomes increasingly normalized as federal courts 
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increasingly situate the rights of immigrants in their overall analysis.320 
Rights normalization is not a causal argument, just as Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth’s 
normalization account is not a causal argument. The federal judiciary may not be normalizing 
immigration law because it is clashing with the rights of immigrants, though that seems to be a 
likely account. All this argument establishes is that normalization appears to encounter more fertile 
soil when the courts perceive the rights of immigrants to be at stake than when it is the foreign 
relations concerns of the United States.321 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is slowly and surely shaping immigration law into a “normal” body of 
law—at least when the rights of immigrants are affected. Just as a broad survey may obscure 
specific trends within a population, a general overview of immigration decisions hides the areas in 
which normalization has occurred. Viewed as a monolith, immigration law has only slowly shifted, 
but viewed as a collection of constituent parts, immigration law has become increasingly 
normalized in particular areas that implicate immigrants’ rights. 
By analyzing immigration law through the framework of normalization, several lessons 
become evident. First, the manner in which Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth describe 
normalization—as a monolithic shift in law—ignores the ways in which foreign relations law can 
normalize at different rates, and in different places, within the broader body of doctrine. 
Relatedly, a promising area for future research is in the application of rights-focused 
frameworks elsewhere in foreign relations law.322 The habeas corpus decisions arising during the 
War on Terror, including Hamdi, Hamdan and Boumediene, are likely explicable as rights 
normalization decisions, in which an increased emphasis upon the rights of detainees hastened the 
pace of normalization in national security law.323 
Rights normalization offers scholars a new story to understand the process of normalization. 
For those who wish to see greater normalization in foreign relations law, Professors Sitaraman and 
Wuerth offer an optimistic narrative of normalization: foreign relations law is striding into a new, 
normal world of doctrine. For those who focus on the Court’s persistently exceptional areas of 
law—such as the retention of the plenary power doctrine in immigration—a more pessimistic story 
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is apt. Normalization is not occurring here; immigration law remains stubbornly exceptional. 
Rights normalization offers a third story. Under the narrative of rights normalization, 
immigration law has become more normal in some areas of immigration law, while remaining 
stubbornly exceptional in others. This account is uniquely able to make sense of the Court’s 
seemingly conflicting decisions about justiciability, federalism, executive deference and inherent 
powers, while highlighting those areas of immigration law that remain exceptional. 
